Risk homeostasis theory - A study of intrinsic compensation by Hoyes, TW et al.
 Risk homeostasis theory - A study of intrinsic 
compensation. 
 
 
Thomas W. Hoyes1,  Neville A Stanton2*,  R. G Taylor1 
 
 
1. Human Factors Research Unit,  2. Department of Psychology 
Aston Business School  University of Southampton 
Aston Triangle  Highfield 
Birmingham  B4 7ET  Southampton  SO9 5NH 
 
 
 
 
*Please send all correspondence to this address. 
 
 Abstract 
Risk Homeostasis Theory (RHT) suggests that changes made to the intrinsic risk 
of environments are negated in one of three ways:  behavioural adjustments 
within the environment, mode migration, and avoidance of the physical risk.  To 
date, this three-way model of RHT has little empirical support, whilst research 
findings on RHT have at times been diametrically opposed.  A reconciliation of 
apparently opposing findings might be possible by suggesting that extrinsic 
compensation fails to restore previously existing levels of actual risk in cases 
where behavioural adjustments within the environment are incapable of negating 
intrinsic risk changes.  This paper reports a study in which behavioural 
adjustments within the physical risk-taking environment are capable of 
reconciling target with actual risk.  The results provide positive support for RHT 
in the form of an overcompensation for the intrinsic risk change on specific 
driver behaviours.  
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 Introduction 
 
Risk homeostasis theory, or RHT (Wilde, 1982a, 1982b, 1988, 1989), is one of several 
theories that stress the importance of human factors in interventions aimed at improving 
environmental risk.  In essence, the theory holds that it is the target level of risk, rather than 
the absolute level of environmental risk, that determines accident loss .  RHT therefore posits 
a population-level closed loop process in which target and actual risk are compared.  Wilde 
conceptualises target risk as the level of risk that the individual deems acceptable.  This level 
is set by the values of four relevant 'utilities':  the and benefits of relatively cautious 
behaviour, the costs and benefits of relatively dangerous behaviour.  If one or more of these 
utilities change, a corresponding change in target risk can be expected to follow.  Risk 
homeostasis, then, is not about risk taking for its own sake, but rather, presents a picture of 
risk-taking behaviour built on the concept of utility.  (We use the preposition on rather than 
with to imply that any falsification of the role of utility in determining risk-taking behaviour 
in response to a change in the level of intrinsic risk, would be bound to leave the theory in a 
state of conceptual ruins.) 
 
How might one evaluate the claims made by the proponents of RHT?  Four approaches have 
so far characterised the debate.  One approach has been the construction of 
theoretical/cognitive and mathematical modelling (O'Neill, 1977).  This approach involves 
predicting behaviour from utility terms.  O'Neill introduces here the notion of a negative 
utility for the costs of accidents in his model.  The difficulty with such modelling is that it 
has so far proved impossible to derive from it very much in the way of testable hypotheses.  
The models are not only unverified, they would seem to be unverifiable.   
 
The second approach is to examine accident loss statistics before and after an intervention. 
Perhaps the best example here, and certainly one that has attracted a great deal of attention, is 
that of compulsory seat-belt wearing (Adams, 1985; Bohlin, 1967, 1977; Bohlin and 
Aasberg, 1976; Chodkiewicz and Dubarry, 1977; Foldvary and Lane, 1974; Hurst, 1979; 
Lund, 1981).  This approach suffers from a lack of experimental control:  after some 
interventions, it is often difficult to establish what risk-relevant factors have changed, other 
than the intervention itself.  Next, there is the quasi-experimental study (see Lund and Zador, 
1984 and Smith and Lovegrove, 1983).  This involves taking measures of specific driver 
behaviours, such as speed, headway and so on, before and after some local intervention 
aimed at improving intrinsic safety.  There are difficulties with this approach too.  First, just 
as in any quasi-experimental methodology, and in common with the analysis of road-accident 
 
 statistics, it can be difficult to disentangle cause from effect. Second, as highlighted by 
Hoyes, Dorn and Taylor (1992), in common with the analysis of accident loss statistics, it 
only addresses half of the RHT question - the consequences of a change in intrinsic risk in 
terms of accident loss.  Whether individuals are characterised by a target level of risk, and 
whether this target can be shifted via changes in relevant utilities, are questions that the 
quasi-experimental study can never answer. 
 
The fourth methodology associated with RHT is the simulation approach.  Many attempts 
have been made to understand risk homeostasis theory in simulated risk-taking environments 
(Mittenecker,1962; Näätänen and Summala , 1975; Veling,1984; Wilde, Claxton-Oldfield 
and Platenius, 1985; Tränkle and Gelau, 1992). Hoyes et al.  (1992) argue that all these early 
simulations are flawed in that they rely for their validity on generalisation from non-physical 
to physical risk-taking, and that this assumption is unwarranted.  Moreover, they point out 
that the awarding of points as a substitute for the real utility of a risk-taking experience is 
both conceptually inappropriate and laden with demand characteristics.  Thus, the simulated 
examination of RHT undertaken by Hoyes et al. involved some attempt to simulate physical 
risk. 
 
It is important, now,  to recall that in Wilde's (1982a, 1982b, 1988) model of risk 
homeostasis theory, it is suggested that the mechanism by which an equilibrium state of 
accident loss is said to take place involves three separate behavioural choices (Wilde, 1988, 
proposition 2).  When a change is made to the level of environmental risk, the risk-taker may 
respond first by behavioural adjustments within the risk-taking environment.  In a road traffic 
environment, this may involve driving faster or slower, overtaking less frequently, reducing 
the marginal temporal leeway at which an overtake will be attempted, increasing or 
decreasing attention, and so on.  A second route to the achievement of homeostasis is what 
one might term 'mode migration' - changing from one form of transport to another.  For 
example, a motorcyclist may decide, in the light of inclement weather, to take a train into 
work rather than risk collision on his or her motorcycle.  Finally, if the level of target risk 
and the level of actual risk cannot be reconciled either within the risk-taking environment, or 
through changing from one mode of transport to another, the individual may elect to stay at 
home and not to undertake any journey.  This possibility, for the purposes of this paper, will 
be referred to as 'avoidance'. 
 
So, the achievement of risk homeostasis can, according to its originator,  be brought about in 
three ways.  These can be labelled behavioural adjustments within the environment, mode 
 
 migration, and avoidance.  Out of this comes a realisation that all of the above attempts to 
examine RHT in simulated environments have, in fact, looked only at one possible pathway 
to homeostasis:  behavioural adjustments within the environment.  Interesting though this 
question is, it would appear to answer only one third of the risk homeostasis model. 
 
To examine the question of whether RHT might receive active support in an environment in 
which the further degree of freedom exists to restore the correspondence of target with actual 
risk via the adjustment of specific driver behaviours, the Aston Driving Simulator was used.  
Indirect manipulations were made to the temporal leeway allowed for overtaking 
manoeuvres.  In such a study, adjustments to intrinsic risk can, unlike study 1, be negated by 
behavioural adjustment within the environment (eg, overtaking less frequently, adopting new 
decision rules, etc.). 
 
The study of overtaking behaviour is not new (see Crawford, 1963).  Much attention has 
been given to the issue of overtaking margin and type of vehicle.  It has, for example, been 
shown that drivers of small cars often adopt riskier headways (Wasielewski, 1981), although 
Evans and Rothery (1976) provide evidence which suggests that findings like that of 
Wasielewski might be at least partly explained by differences between driver groups.  
Whether a correlational fallacy or not, it is known that drivers of powerful cars tend to make 
fewer errors when overtaking (Kaukinen, 1967).   
 
Harris, Brindle and Muir (1986) point out that the power of a vehicle is of less interest than 
the power to weight ratio.  They found that HGV drivers specifically, and generally drivers 
of low power to weight ratio vehicles, adopt riskier overtaking strategies.  By contrast, 
drivers of high power to weight ratio vehicles were shown to adopt relatively safe overtaking 
strategies.  Unfortunately, Harris et al. were unable, just as previous researchers, to eliminate 
the possiblity that overtaking differences may have been attributable to driver-related, rather 
than vehicle-related, factors.  An advantage of a counterbalanced, repeated-measures design, 
such as the one reported here, is that the same 'drivers' can be asked to participate under 
different overtaking conditions, thus eliminating driver-related overtaking factors. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
 
 Seventy participants took part in this study.  Thirty-five participants were aged between 18 
and 30 years; the remaining thirty-five participants were aged between 45 and 60 years. 
 
Equipment 
The Aston Driving Simulator (see Glendon, this volume) was used for this study. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
All participants were given two experimental trials.  In condition 1, cars in front of the 
simulated driving position moved at speeds of between 20 and 30 mph.  In condition 2,  the 
cars in front of the simulated driving position were moving at speeds of between 30 and 40 
mph.  Condition order was counterbalanced.  Given that the speed of on-coming cars was 
held constant across these two conditions, condition 2 can be considered environmentally the 
riskier condition in that overtaking times (together with error margins) would be reduced.  If 
overtaking behaviour were to remain unchanged between the two conditions, and if no other 
behavioural compensation were to occur, one would predict greater accident loss on 
condition 2.  However, this can be considered a very local change to environmental risk and 
one that could be compensated for, in theory at least, by changes to the overtaking-decision 
threshold, commensurate with the change in risk.  Measures were therefore taken to establish 
whether the changes in behaviour were indeed either local in themselves or consequences of 
local changes to environmental risk (knock-on effects of local adjustments).  Measures were 
also taken to establish the extent to which a more general compensation process might be 
pursued, along with the usual measures reflecting accident loss: other-vehicle collisions and 
kerb-collisions. 
 
Results 
 
1.  The overtaking (specific) measures 
 
Where the environment was characterised by higher levels of environmental  risk, this was 
associated with fewer other-vehicle collisions, fewer successful overtakes, and fewer end-
pull-backs (aborted overtakes).  It was associated with more kerb collisions whilst 
overtaking, though not significantly more.   
 
Related t-tests were carried out on all the above comparisons.  Risky overtakes occurred on 
significantly fewer occasions on the condition of high environmental risk, t=2, p=.024.  This 
 
 is shown in figure 1.  For the purpose of this experiment, a risky overtake was defined as one 
in which an oncoming car was visible from the driver's position when the participant pulled 
out to overtake.  The comparison of aborted overtakes produced t=3.15, p=.0012.  This 
comparison is shown in figure 2.  For the number of 'other vehicle collisions whilst 
overtaking' comparison the t value of 1.70 was significant (p=.0464).  Kerb collisions whilst 
overtaking produced a t value of <1, NS, as did the comparison of total overtakes. 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 : Environmental risk and mean number of 'risky' overtakes 
 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 : Environmental risk and mean number of aborted overtakes 
 
 
Successful overtakes too occurred on fewer occasions in the condition of high environmental 
risk, t=1.957, p=.0272.  Finally, the comparison of mean leeway was on the margin of 
significance with t=1.594, p=.0577. 
 
2.  The non-overtaking (general) measures 
 
Related t-tests were carried out for a range of general indicators of driver behaviour, across 
the two conditions of environmental risk.  First, the comparison of road position (position 
relative to centre white line and kerb) across conditions was not significant (t<1, NS).  It has 
been argued previously (Hoyes et al., 1992) that road position can be considered a measure 
of tracking performance, and therefore, by inference, an indirect measure of attention and 
specific motor skills.  Since benefits may well be gained from maintaining reduced levels of 
attention, one could look upon this as a general measure of compensation, not local to the 
change in environmental risk.  From this it would seem that arguments for a more general 
form of compensation related to attention would not be supported. 
 
  
The second of these measures to be examined was distance to car in front..  This gave a 
related-t value of 2.67 (p=.0024).  This finding is difficult to interpret.  On the one hand, the 
behavioural adjustment of pulling closer to the car in front does not facilitate the local need 
for adjustment.  However, when one looks more closely at the behaviour one sees that the 
finding is in fact the reverse of that which would be predicted by RHT.  Rather than respond 
to the change in environmental risk by increasing the 'safety' gap, drivers were, it would 
appear, making an already riskier situation (environmentally speaking), more risky still 
(behaviourally speaking) by moving closer to the car in front.  Perhaps then this finding can 
be explained in terms of its being an almost mechanical consequence of the change to 
environmental risk, or rather, its specific manifestation:  when drivers are prevented from 
overtaking a car, they tend to move closer to the car preventing the manoeuvre.  This 
behaviour can therefore not be considered a general case of behavioural compensation, but is 
probably best explained outside of a compensation framework. 
 
Mean speed too was examined and proved significant with a t value of 8.98, p<.0001.  The 
effect of environmental risk on this measure is shown in figure 3.  Although one might again 
imagine that this finding would be difficult to interpret (speed adjustments might reflect a 
general compensation, or may just be a trivial consequence of not being able to overtake so 
frequently, or having to overtake at higher speeds) the direction of the difference is again 
able to settle the matter.  The condition of high environmental risk was associated with 
greater speeds.  Far from compensating through this pathway, participants actually made 
things worse. 
 
INSERT FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3 : Environmental risk and mean speed in simulated mph. 
 
Accelerator mean position, correlated with speed, of course, showed no effect of 
environmental risk (t=1.038, NS).  In fact, the correlation between accelerator travel and 
mean speed, whilst strong, perhaps does not quite reach the strength one might imagine - 
r=.505 (SD of mean speed across conditions = 6.55; SD of mean accelerator travel across 
conditions = 14.21; covariance of xy = 47.04).  Again, this general pathway moved away 
from, rather than supporting, homeostasis. 
 
 
 Brake was significantly different across conditions (t=4.53, p=<.0001).  Again, this result is 
perhaps best seen as a mechanical consequence to changes in local environmental risk.  
Where overtaking is made more difficult, drivers will have more often to abandon an 
overtake, and this may well involve greater use of the brake. 
 
The mean position of the steering wheel also differed between conditions (t=-3.97, p<.0001).  
On the surface this might reflect either nothing more complicated than a greater number of 
overtakes on one condition rather than another, or a reflection of relative attention level.  
Since differences in the number of overtakes and attempted overtakes must necessarily be 
reflected in steering wheel position, and since position on road did not provide evidence of 
attentional differences across conditions, the former suggestion has perhaps more appeal. 
 
Finally the two measures reflecting accident loss should be considered.  On the condition of 
greater environmental risk there were fewer other-vehicle collisions (hitting another car) and 
fewer kerb collisions (hitting the kerb) than on the condition of low environmental risk.  In 
the case of other-vehicle collisions (the more serious measure of accident loss) this 
difference was significant (t=3.66;  p=.0002).  This is shown in figure 4.  The effect of 
environmental risk on kerb collisions is shown in figure 5. 
 
INSERT FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure  4 :  The effect of environmental risk on mean number of other-vehicle collisions 
 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE FIVE ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 5 :  The effect of environmental risk on mean number of kerb collisions. 
 
 
The strong implication from the measures reflecting accident loss seems to be that 
behavioural compensation can occur in the short term and that initial adjustments may be 
characterised by their tendencies towards being over-compensatory.  In predicting that initial 
compensation can be perfect, imperfect surplus or imperfect deficit, RHT really says only 
that in the short term anything can happen.  In other words, any finding could have been 
 
 reconciled with RHT.  The findings on other-vehicle collisions, however, are far more 
satisfactory than the open prediction in that they (i) provide active support for compensation 
and; (ii) do so at very low alpha levels.   
 
Discussion 
 
This experiment is arguably the most significant simulation study of RHT for several 
reasons. First, in providing evidence of significant initial over-compensation, the study has 
provided the clearest findings so far in support of  RHT.  In direct opposition to an 
engineering perspective, this study showed that on the condition of high environmental risk, 
there were fewer collisions, both with the kerb and with other vehicles.  Whereas RHT has 
evidence to support it from field studies involving  crude before-and-after designs, this study 
provides evidence for RHT in a tightly-controlled, laboratory study with possible 
confounding variables removed. 
 
Second, the study shows that the investigation of RHT hypotheses in a simulated physical 
risk-taking environment can be successful to the extent of bringing about an effect.  If Wilde 
is correct in his assertion that road-users are characterised by a target level of risk, which is 
maintained when changes in environmental safety are introduced, then this study would 
indicate that this same process can be successfully reproduced in a simulated environment.   
 
Third, the study is interesting in that it provides evidence for a movement towards 
homeostasis within a very short time span - when environmental risk changed, participants 
drove for a period of just ten minutes.  Within this period a significant adjustment took place.  
This leaves the question of how participants were able to compensate so quickly.  Two, not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations could account for this.  The first of these is the 
possibility that participants recognised and compensated for the risk change as soon as that 
change was apparent -  as soon, that is, as they realised that overtaking would be more or less 
hazardous if relevant behaviours were maintained at their previous level.  The second 
possibility is that information regarding accident loss, such as other-vehicle collisions, kerb 
collisions or near-misses,  must be given to participants before compensation can occur.  
These two possibilities could be crudely labelled as, respectively, open- and closed- loop 
explanations.   
 
A fourth aspect of this study that makes it interesting is its apparent justification of the 
attention given to the particular behavioural pathways that carry the effect.  It would seem 
 
 from these that where a change in environmental risk is highly specific, such as the time 
margin allowed to overtake vehicles, this specific risk change is responded to by participants 
by equally specific behaviours - behaviours, in other words, that could be said to be relevant 
to the environmental risk change.   
 
The experiment has implications concerning the development of an alternative methodology 
for RHT.  The evidence reported here seems to suggest that although the time-scale of 
homeostasis in real physical risk-taking situations spans months or even years (see Wilde 
1988, 1989), this may be nothing more than a consequence of delayed feedback.  As long as 
immediate feedback of errors and of the change in intrinsic safety can be provided, a 
simulated environment may be entirely appropriate for investigating compensatory 
behaviours over a very short time span.  In other words, collapsed experience must be 
possible for effective investigation to take place. 
 
A word or two needs saying about the way in which environmental risk was operationalised 
in this study.  In order to make the risk change specific to some particular behaviours, the 
environmental risk factor of temporal leeway was operationalised.  However, as stated in the 
method section, this manipulation was not direct, as would have been the case, say, had the 
simulator's acceleration capabilities been altered, but was instead indirect through the 
manipulation of the average speed of cars on the simulator's driver-side of the road.  When 
the average speed was increased, the temporal leeway was, indirectly, reduced.  But can such 
an indirect manipulation really be said to change environmental risk?  A critic might point 
out that when cars in front  were moving at greater speeds, the driver had a much reduced 
need to overtake them, and thus, it may even be that the direction of the change in 
environmental risk is the opposite to that reported here.  A number of arguments can be used 
to rebut this criticism and suggest that the indirectly reduced temporal leeway condition 
really did represent a reduction in environmental risk: 
 
1.  Two participants were run and interviewed informally in a pilot study.  Both these 
participants agreed that the reduced temporal leeway condition was in their view the more 
hazardous.  In the case of the Swedish experience in changing the side of road on which 
road-users were asked to drive, it must be remembered that one side of the road is 
intrinsically no more dangerous than the other.  What  made the Swedish case relevant to the 
RHT debate was that those affected by the change had some subjective experience of risk 
change.  Since workers in RHT from both sides of the debate are in agreement that the 
Swedish experience is relevant to the homeostasis question because of this subjective 
 
 experience, agreement by participants in the pilot study that the reduced temporal leeway 
condition did represent higher risk might be said to be justification enough. 
 
2.  For the indirect manipulation of leeway to fail in changing environmental risk in the 
predicted direction, participants must have a reduced need to overtake at the higher speeds.  
Extensive pilot work from other studies involving the ADS suggests that this tendency is 
subject to floor effects.  So long as the maximum speed of the car being followed is equal to 
or less than 40 mph (as was the case in this study) participants will be characterised by 
overtaking behaviour.   
 
3.  The reduced temporal leeway condition allows greater speeds to be reached for the same 
level of overtaking.  Since speed is known to be correlated with risk, this too should lead to 
the conclusion that the reduced temporal leeway condition is environmentally the more 
hazardous. 
 
4.  The measure of mean leeway is independent of the number of times participants overtook 
other vehicles.  If speed increases in the vehicles being followed led to reductions in the 
number of overtakes, this measure takes this reduction into account.  The measure of mean 
leeway is on the margin of significance (p=.0577). 
 
In fact the indirect nature of this risk change was deliberate.  To have manipulated leeways 
directly through acceleration capability would led to delayed feedback and a number of 
inevitable collisions during learning.  The indirect manipulation was an attempt to provide 
almost concurrent feedback.  Moreover, it was felt that this indirect approach had greater 
ecological validity.  We often find ourselves with less time of overtake other vehicles 
because the vehicles ahead of us are driving faster; we rarely suffer a reduced temporal 
leeway through a failure of our vehicles to accelerate to the same speed in the same time that 
they did a few moments ago.  In essence, a direct manipulation of temporal leeway would 
have involved just this.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The suggestion that adjustments capable of achieving a correspondence between target and 
actual risk is contingent upon the extent to which behavioural adjustments within the 
 
 environment are possible receives support in the context of the study reported here.  
However,  further research is needed in establishing whether such a model might explain 
actual accident loss in response to environmental risk improvements. 
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